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TThe theoretical and practical literature on risk management, and, accordingly, university curriculum as well, focuses primarily on the measurement of risk, and the technical details of hedging and insurance strategies. In stand-
ard micro-economic theory, risk preferences 
(risk appetite, risk tolerance, risk propensity, 
risk aversion, etc.) are given, clearly exist-
ing external features, which are never called 
into doubt as long as they behave well from a 
mathematical perspective so that we can base 
optimisation on them.2
As a consequence of results in behavioural 
finance as well as the most recent regulatory 
developments, however, focus clearly shifted 
to risk preferences. This prompted advisory 
practice to react by implementing and im-
proving models to assess risk appetite. In our 
article, we first provide a brief summary of 
utility theory, followed by the results of be-
havioural finance, then review the characteris-
tics of practical models that serve to measure 
risk appetite.
Risk appetite in utility theoRy3
securities that provide a w1 amount to the 
holder with probability p and a w2 amount 
with probability (1–p) are called risky pay-
ments or prospects. These prospects, as risky 
securities, differ from one another in terms of 
parameters, and there is a given investor who 
is looking for the optimal portfolio. In order 
to solve this problem, the investor must first 
rank these prospects according to how attrac-
tive these are to him/her (preference order-
ing).
It has been proved (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944), that if the investor’s 
preference ordering fulfils certain axioms 
(completeness, reflexivity, transitivity, con-
tinuity and strict monotony), then there ex-
ists a continuous utility function that repre-
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sents the given investor’s preference ordering. 
of course, all monotonic transforms of this 
continuous function may equally be consid-
ered the investor’s utility function. It has also 
been proved that if certain other conditions 
are met, there is a monotonic transformation 
that helps us arrive at a special utility func-
tion which has the so-called expected utility 
feature (von Neumann, Morgenstern, vNM 
utility function):
u(prospect)=pu(w1)+(1–p)u(w2)
In other words, a vNM utility function may 
be clearly constructed for every well-behaving 
preference ordering.4 In essence, rational-
ity means that the investor’s decisions can be 
traced back to such a vNM utility function.5
A direct relationship can be established be-
tween the shape of the utility function and 
risk propensity, as shown in Chart 1.
The more concave the investor’s vNM util-
ity function, the more he may be considered 
risk averse. so-called local risk aversion in 
point w can be measured using the Arrow-
Pratt measure of risk aversion, which is a 
standardised indicator of the concavity of the 
utility function:6
A(w)=– u"(w)u'(w)
If the local risk aversion indicator of inves-
tor X, A(w), is greater for every w than that of 
investor Y, then investor X can be said to be 
globally more risk averse than investor Y. 
The utility function of a risk averse investor 
may be any concave function, and the A(w) 
measure changes depending on the shape of 
the function as a result of the change of w. If, 
for example, the utility function is shaped like 
a root function (u=√—w) or logarithmic func-
tion (ln(w)), then A(w) decreases in wealth, 
which means that the richer we are, the less 
we are afraid of risk, at least in the absolute 
sense.7 In the case of a quadratic utility func-
tion, for example (u=aw–bw2), however, risk 
aversion increases in wealth, which contra-
dicts practical experiences.
Chart 1
The uTiliTy funcTions of risk averse and risk seeking invesTors
Source: Based on Figure 11.1 of Varian (1992)
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Another special case is when the utility 
function can be written in the following form:
u(w)=–e–aw
It is easy to verify that in this case, absolute 
risk aversion A(w) is constant and is equal to 
parameter a (cARA ‒ constant absolute risk 
aversion). Moreover, if the wealth is of normal 
distribution, then 
Eu(w)=–e–r (w
–– A 2w )2
i.e. expected utility increases in 
w– – A 2w ,2
in other words, using a monotonic transforma-
tion, we can transition from the wealth utility 
function to a utility function interpreted in re-
turns, in the formula of which, with expected 
return (r– ) and its variance (2r ) the A absolute 
risk aversion measure continues to feature:
U(r–  ,2w  )= r
– –
A 2r2
This utility function is the starting point 
for the Markowitz portfolio theory and the 
cAPM based on it.8 For modelling, other risk 
rates may also be used in the utility function, 
and risk rejection takes on new meaning as a 
function thereof.9
It should be observed, therefore, that the 
standard risk aversion indicator (A) used in 
textbooks10 is linked firstly to the existence 
of the utility function, and secondly to a very 
special form of this function and, further-
more, only makes sense with the normality of 
returns and specifically measures absolute risk 
aversion (calculated as an amount of money), 
which incidentally, in this special case, is 
wholly independent of the investor’s current 
wealth situation. 
The empirical experiments presented in the 
next section do not actually relate to the meas-
urement of this coefficient A, but go deeper 
and ultimately question the existence of the 
utility function.
Risk appetite in pRospect theoRy
Kahneman and Tversky conducted extensive 
psychological experimental research in order 
to map out the actual risk attitude of peo-
ple. They summed up their results in their 
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; 1992). As part of behavioural studies 
that have since come into scientific focus, the 
risk appetite of individuals and groups were 
examined in a number of other dimensions. 
We will sum up these results in the sections 
below.
On the trail of  the utility function
The so-called Allais Paradox had significant 
impact on the research conducted by Kahne-
man and Tversky, and the paradox is present-
ed in the former’s book (Kahneman, 2011), 
albeit he uses an example slightly different 
from that of Allais. consider the following 
problem-pairs: 
uWhich of the two options below would 
you choose?
A) 61% chance to win usD 520,000 
B) 63% chance to win usD 500,000
vWhich of the two options below would 
you choose?
c) 98% chance to win usD 520,000 
D) 100% chance to win usD 500,000
According to experimental research, most 
people first choose A, then D of the options. 
With this, however, they commit a logical er-
ror that calls into doubt the existence of the 
utility function, and thus the canonical model 
of rational choice as well. Let’s assume initially 
that the investor prefers option A to option 
B. In this case, according to the vNM utility 
function:
0,61  u(520) > 0,63  u(500)
on the other hand, in the case of a 
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monotonically increasing utility function, it is 
trivial that:
0,37  u(520) ≥ 0,37  u(500)
If we add up the left and right side of the 
above two inequalities, then the rules of formal 
logic would dictate that the following be true:
0,98  u(520) > 1  u(500)
in other words, option c must be more 
valuable than option D, regardless of whether 
the given investor is risk averse or risk seek-
ing. If someone were to choose options A and 
D in succession, this decision cannot be char-
acterised based on the principle of expected 
utility, in other words, there is no vNM utility 
function that would correspond to this deci-
sion pair, i.e. the given individual’s preference 
ordering does not even have the simplest good 
features, the decision is not consistent and as 
such is not rational.
In Hungarian literature, there is a mislead-
ing and increasingly widespread misconcep-
tion concerning the Allais Paradox. A number 
of authors (e.g. Hámori, 2003; Molnár, 2006) 
argue that the problem with the A‒D choice 
is that the investor is not maximising expected 
return, in other words, is not clearly opting 
for A‒c, see Table 1.
This, however, is not a sound explanation 
as we clearly do not expect a rational decision 
maker to decide based on expected value, but 
on the basis of expected utility. A rational risk 
averse investor could safely choose options 
B‒c or B‒D, namely the options with the 
lowest expected value, and still avoid contra-
dicting the principle of expected utility. But 
after option A, if he wants to make a rational 
decision, he cannot select option D due to the 
logic presented above.
Kahneman and Tversky also measured 
(Kahneman, 2011) the average subjective de-
cision weights that experiment subjects use 
instead of the various objective probabilities 
when making risky choices, see Table 2.
Experiments, therefore, show that typically 
we are unable to handle very low and very 
high probabilities well, and are prone to pay 
too much for possibility and certainty. Based 
on this, the authors defined two behavioural 
features, which are as follows: 
Certainty effect: A 2 per cent improvement 
from 98 to 100 per cent seems more valuable 
than a 2 per cent improvement from 61 to 63 
per cent. Even though as far as expected utility 
is concerned they should be worth the same. 
Yet, for some inexplicable reason, we pay too 
much to ensure that our gains change from 
almost certain to absolutely certain.
Possibility effect: We are similarly prone to 
overpay to have the probability of winning in-
crease from 0 to a very low level, i.e. we also 
overvalue the change when we shift from the 
impossible to the possible.
When these same effects are realised not 
just under laboratory circumstances but also 
Table 1






Source: authors based on kahneman (2011)
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in actual decisions, then both insurance (cer-
tainty effect) and gambling (possibility effect) 
are particularly good business – from the ser-
vice provider’s perspective of course and not 
the customer’s.
According to prospect theory (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979; 1992), people are not in-
terested in the absolute level of their wealth 
as utility theory assumes (most of us have no 
idea about our current wealth). our satisfac-
tion is much more determined by our most 
recent gains and losses. If, for instance, we win 
HuF 10 million and lose it in the next step, 
we will most likely be much unhappier than if 
we had won nothing, even though our wealth 
has not changed. We have also seen that when 
making decisions, we are prone to using our 
own subjective decision weights. This outlines 
a fourfold pattern of risk attitudes .
As Table 3 shows: depending on whether we 
are talking about gains or losses, or whether 
probabilities are very low or very high, we re-
late to risks very differently depending on the 
given situation.11 In the case of large expected 
gains or low expected loss, we tend to be risk 
averse, and this is completely in line with tra-
ditional utility theory. It is also a well-known 
phenomenon that in the hope of very low 
probability gains, greed may take over from 
time to time and we may become risk-seeking; 
however, for a long time this was considered 
to be a marginal phenomenon that has no im-
pact on investment decisions. But the real sur-
prise for both researchers and the professional 
public came when it was found that when we 
are in a clearly losing situation, in desperation 
we are prone to taking even more risks only 
to have some slight hope of, by some miracle, 
getting away with it. This is the reason why 
while the shape of the gains function is con-
cave, the loss function is convex, see Chart 2.
It should be noted that the real novelty here 
is not the fact that the results are not compatible 
with the general concavity of the utility func-
tion, i.e. investor risk aversion, but that they are 
not compatible with any wealth utility function.
Prospect theory, i.e. the value function, 
cannot be used to base a general portfolio the-
ory or equilibrium pricing model on because 
we cannot be certain what the origin shown 
in the above chart corresponds to. This may 
be the investor’s current wealth, but it may be 
a personal expectation which, as shown by ex-
periments, develops and changes over time in 
a completely subjective and haphazard fashion 
(e.g. someone at one time said a round num-




There has been extensive research on how peo-
ple’s risk propensity is related to their socio-
demographic-cognitive characteristics.
The results are extremely diverse but in a 
simplified form, they can be summarised as 
follows (Varga and ulbert, 2005):
•	men are more risk-taking than women,
Table 2
objecTive and subjecTive probabiliTies (%)
objektive  
probabilitiy
0 1 2 5 10 20 50 80 90 95 98 99 100
subjektive  
probability
0 5.5 8.1 13.2 18.6 26.1 42.1 60.1 71.2 79.3 87.1 92.1 100
Source: kahneman, 2011
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•	young people are more risk-taking than 
the elderly,
•	high-income people are more risk-taking 
than low-income individuals,
•	highly educated people are more risk-tak-
ing than individuals with a low level of or 
no education.
These research results may be compatible 
with both utility theory and prospect theory, 
as they link risk propensity with relatively sta-
ble characteristics.
similarly, Frederick (2005) has also shown 
that decision makers with higher cognitive ca-
pabilities are usually more risk-taking than those 
with lower cognitive capabilities (based on IQ 
and cRT test results).12 Frederick (2005), how-
ever, did not stop here and went on to conduct 
more differentiated research based on the pros-
pect theory. Firstly, he found that as far as gains 
were concerned, people with higher cognitive 
capabilities were clearly more risk-taking, and 
this was especially true for men. The situation 
in a loss-making position, however, was just the 
opposite, and this time around it was subjects 
with lower cRT scores who risked more. Sousa 
(2010), however, called these results into doubt 
Table 3
fourfold risk aTTiTude based on prospecT Theory
gains losses
hiGh pRoBaBility  
certainty effect
risk aversion  
(fear of disappointment)
risk seeking  
(avoiding to admit loss at any cost)
loW pRoBaBility  
possibility effect
risk seeking  
(greed)
risk aversion  
(fear of greater loss)
Source: kahneman (2011)
Chart 2
value funcTion according To uTiliTy Theory
Source: kahneman and tversky (1979)
Subjective assessment
Change in wealth
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on the grounds that increased risk-taking in the 
higher cRT range is the result of a better un-
derstanding of incentives and not behavioural 
effects. If we filter out this incentive effect, no 
significant risk-taking difference is observed 
in the dimension of cognitive capabilities, see 
sousa (2010).
Other factors that determine risk-taking
However, risk-taking does not just depend on 
the general characteristics of experiment sub-
jects, but also on their current physical, men-
tal and psychological state.13 Below is a non-
exhaustive list of such effects.
Decision fatigue: If we are tired, we auto-
matically become more averse to risk. Making 
multiple decisions depletes the self, a fact also 
indicated by a drop in blood-sugar levels. Re-
charging can fundamentally be accomplished 
through rest and eating, resulting in the return 
of the willingness to take risks (Baumeister 
and Tierney, 2011).
social loaf: People tend to take more risks 
when in groups than they do alone. The main 
reason for this is most likely that in case of 
failure, blame can be shifted to the others 
(Dobelli, 2013). 
Affect heuristic: If we like something or 
happen to be in a good mood, we perceive 
risk to be lower and gains to be greater than 
they actually are. Hirschleifer and Shumway 
(2003) for example examined the relationship 
between the daily returns of 26 stocks and 
morning sunshine, and found the relationship 
to be clearly positive. 
Gender impulses: As part of the experi-
ment, they showed photographs of beautiful 
women, and as a result participating male 
subjects became perceptibly more risk-taking. 
This, however, did not work with photographs 
of less pretty women or the switching of gen-
ders (Baumeister and Tierney, 2012).
Limelight effect: People are far more risk-
taking in full anonymity than in the lime-
light. This calls for special attention during 
the planning of laboratory experiments and 
the interpretation of results as in this respect, 
the laboratory creates a secure, intimate situ-
ation which increases participant courage. In 
contrast, when the researchers asked for pres-
entations before an audience or made video 
recordings, participants became considerably 
more cautious (Baltussen, van dem Assem, 
van Dolder, 2014). on a related note, other 
researchers have already pointed out that for 
example, as a result of the transition to on-
line trading, investors have become more risk 
seeking (Barber and odean, 2001). 
Easy come, easy go effect (house money ef-
fect): Thaler and Johnson (1990) have shown 
that we treat money completely differently de-
pending on whether it was easily gained or hard 
to acquire. If we have won, found or inherited 
the money, we tend to be more easy-going 
about spending and risking it than we would 
be if we had earned it with hard work. As a re-
sult, lottery winners, for instance, usually find 
themselves worse off financially in a space of a 
few years than they were prior to winning.
Minsky effect: success increases risk pro-
pensity, i.e. risk appetite increases as a conse-
quence of successive gains (path dependency) 
(Minsky, 1992).
These effects are contrasting with utility 
theory because they question the existence 
of a risk-taking disposition that is stable and 
consistent in time and is characteristic of in-
dividuals.
assessment oF Risk appetite  
in pRactice
With respect to practical research, by risk ap-
petite we mean the extent to which an inves-
tor is willing to take risks in a given situation, 
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and what compensation he expects for the risk 
taken. Risk appetite clearly has an effect on 
the expected return of risky assets. If the risk 
appetite of market players drops, expected re-
turn increases and asset prices drop (Misina, 
2003; Gai and Vause, 2005). Dungey, Gonza-
lez-Hermosillo, Fry et al. (2003) have empiri-
cally proven that the changes in the risk ap-
petite of investors in developed markets are 
clearly linked to the changes of the bond re-
turn premiums of emerging markets. 
During investment advising or corporate 
consultation, becoming familiar with the giv-
en investor’s or company’s risk appetite is es-
sential for portfolio optimisation or to deter-
mine strategy and to break down this strategy 
into elements.14,15 The significance of this has 
also been recognised by regulatory authorities. 
The MiFID Directive (Market in Financial In-
struments Directive 2004/39/Ec – European 
Parliament and European council 2004) en-
tered into force in the European union on 1 
November 2007, mandating that investment 
service providers assess customer risk appe-
tite in order to be able to offer a suitable in-
vestment portfolio to all (Kaufmann, Weber, 
Haisley, 2013). 
It is a great dilemma, however, how advi-
sors should relate to investors’ or companies’ 
irrational intentions: should they attempt to 
curb it and smuggle back consistent, utility 
function-based decision-making; or should 
they become familiar with heuristics and al-
low them to prevail, on the grounds that for 
some reason, they are what makes the custom-
er happy. should they educate or simply serve 
their customers?
This section reviews the methods most 
widely used in practice, developed to identify 
risk appetite and used specifically to estimate 
the risk appetites of private individuals. 
Based on Grable and Lytton (1999), the 
methods serving to assess risk appetite may 
be classified into five main categories, and this 
is also what we follow when discussing these: 
choice dilemma, utility theory, objective 
measures, heuristic judgements and subjective 
assessment.
choice dilemma was a popular procedure 
up until the seventies. of the related research 
projects, the research conducted by Wallach 
and Kogan (1959) focusing on the differences 
of decision-making processes between sexes is 
of note. The method placed experiment sub-
jects into 12 different decision-making situa-
tions, where they were asked to compare risky 
payments (prospects) as presented earlier. one 
of the prospects was always riskier than the 
other, however, gains were also greater in the 
event of success. Participants were then asked 
with respect to all 12 decisions on how great 
the probability (p) of winning must be for the 
riskier alternative to make it worth selecting 
for them. They were also asked how certain 
they were of their selection on a scale of 1 
to 5 (certainty factor). They then calculated 
the weighted arithmetic mean of p-values by 
using uncertainty factors as weights (Brim, 
1955). Their assumption was that the greater 
this indicator, the greater the risk rejection. 
The method was criticised on several fronts. 
on the one hand, it seems doubtful that a 
concept as complex as risk propensity can be 
condensed into a single measure (Grable and 
Lytton, 1999). on the other hand, as several 
researchers pointed out, the application of the 
Brim-index cannot be entirely accepted ei-
ther, because there is no close relation between 
risk appetite and the certainty factor (stoner, 
1968; Teger and Pruitt, 1967; Bell and Jamie-
son, 1970). According to another criticism, if 
such a relationship does indeed exist, it cer-
tainly isn’t linear (stroebe and Fraser, 1971).
The method relying on utility theory, based 
on the measurement of the risk aversion in-
dicator (A) in the spirit of the Markowitz 
model, as presented in the first section, was 
highly popular for quite some time. In light of 
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the results of behavioural finance, however, it 
drew considerable criticism, the most lenient 
of which was that in reality risk aversion is not 
constant, but rather a function of several cir-
cumstances, including wealth. A much greater 
problem though is something that prospect 
theory draws attention to, namely that in 
loss-making positions, the majority of people 
suddenly become risk-takers. If we choose to 
disregard this, we can certainly never under-
stand the customer’s true intentions (shefrin 
and statman, 1993). According to Weber, 
Blais, Betz (2002), the primary weakness of 
this particular method is that it fails to take 
into account the fact that we make different 
decisions in different life situations. For exam-
ple, the risk appetite of a company manager 
is different when compiling his own portfo-
lio than when making decisions for the com-
pany. Kaufmann, Weber and Haisley (2013) 
recommend the expansion of the method so 
that investors make decisions in line with ac-
tual utility, and avoid such pitfalls as the pos-
sibility effect or the certainty effect. In their 
view, a complex ‘risk tool’ would be required, 
which would not just include the numerical 
presentation of the risks of the various assets 
and portfolios, but would also have a related 
informative diagram, and the advisor would 
set up situations where investors could gain 
experience and learn. The researchers found 
that when the three methods (numerical pres-
entation, diagram, experience) were applied 
together, participants were not afraid to take 
on substantially greater risk, and were also 
more consistent in their decisions. 
The use of objective measures was first pro-
posed by Sung and Hanna (1996) to measure 
risk propensity. In essence, under the meth-
od the relationship is determined between 
certain specific characteristics of individu-
als (age, family status, income, wealth, etc.) 
and their risk propensity, based on which a 
general model is developed that can be easily 
and swiftly applied in practice. By rethinking 
this methodology, Hanna and Chen (1997) 
dealt with determining the optimal portfolio 
for various types of investors. Their objec-
tive measures included, amongst others, the 
investment time horizon (1 year, 5 years, 20 
years), as well as the ratio of financial assets 
of a single household to its entire wealth. Ac-
cording to Schooley and Worden (1996), ob-
jective measures provide great assistance in 
determining an individual’s risk propensity, 
but we must be aware that the utility theory is 
behind this particular method, namely the as-
sumption that people fundamentally want to 
make rational decisions. The method of objec-
tive measures was developed further by Corter 
and Chen (2006), who proposed a new ques-
tionnaire called Risk Tolerance Questionnaire 
(RTQ). They demonstrated that the question-
naire’s results correlate closely with various 
risk rates, but not at all with an indicator cap-
turing an emotional, subjective dimension. 
This led them to conclude that using a general 
risk appetite indicator that measures only in-
vestment risk, it is impossible to describe an 
individual’s true risk propensity, and thus the 
indicator ‘only’ helps in driving investors to-
wards decision making that is rational and free 
from subjective effects. 
The heuristics method is mostly based on 
the socio-demographic-cognitive factors (gen-
der, age, academic qualifications, etc.) listed 
in the foregoing. Extensive research was con-
ducted in this field as well, however, there is 
no consensus as to which are the precise socio-
demographic-cognitive factors that have the 
greatest explanatory power (Hallahan, Faff 
and McKenzie, 2003). The heuristics method 
does not aim to map out the imaginary util-
ity function, but to get to know the given 
person, and as such, allows – as shown by its 
name – frequently observed heuristics to be 
employed. They do certainly go beyond the 
method of objective measures in that they also 
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include subjective explanatory variables in the 
model (Maccrimmon and Wehrung, 1990; 
Hallahan, Faff and McKenzie, 2003).
MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986) pro-
posed a so-called subjective method that 
combines the various approaches. As part of 
the method, participants are presented with 
various multi-dimensional financial scenarios 
and situations using questionnaires and ex-
periments. According to the researchers, the 
method allows the in-depth exploration of 
the customer’s personal relationship to, for 
instance, bond and stock investments or the 
real estate market. one of the most frequently 
used such multi-dimensional questionnaires 
is the survey of consumer Finance (scF), 
which has been conducted every three years 
since 1983 with the financing of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board on a sample representing 
the entire us population (Yao, Hanna and 
Lindamood, 2004). The significance of the 
questionnaire is well reflected by the fact that 
its results are considered to be a benchmark 
when assessing the effectiveness on other self-
developed questionnaires. Grable and Lytton 
(1999) also created a multi-dimensional ques-
tionnaire, originally made up of 20 questions, 
but later reduced to 13 using factor analysis. 
With the help of the questionnaire, they at-
tempted to reveal respondents’ relationship to 
risk along the following dimensions:
uchoice between certain and uncertain 
outcomes; 
vrisk-taking in general; 
wchoice between certain gain and certain loss; 
xrisk-taking based on experience and 
knowledge; 
yrisk-taking to reach a certain level of 
comfort; 
zspeculation; 
{prospect theory; and 
|investment risk. 
The responses to the questions are given 
points, which are then added up. In this par-
ticular system, the higher a given person’s 
score, the greater their risk propensity. Later 
on, comparing Grable and Lytton’s (1999) 
13-question questionnaire with the scF (sur-
vey of consumer Finance) risk propensity in-
dex, Gilliam et al. (2010) found the former to 
have greater explanatory power. 
Apparently, therefore, these so-called sub-
jective multi-dimensional systems attempt to 
show a wide variety of aspects simultaneous-
ly; as a result, it is unclear how they actually 
relate to utility theory or prospect theory. It 
seems that in the spirit of ‘compromise’, they 
have created a confusing mixture of multiple 
approaches, which still stands the test of prac-
tice in many respects.
summaRy
In recent decades, there has been extensive 
research aimed at exploring how various in-
dividuals and groups relate to risk. Emerging 
from this research, seem to be a few stable 
phenomena that contradict traditional utility 
theory. one example is the fourfold risk model 
described by Kahneman and Tversky. Added 
to this are the correlations found between so-
cio-demographic-cognitive characteristics and 
risk appetite, which are difficult to explain on 
a rational basis. Finally, we have also seen that 
a number of emotional elements also influence 
risk-related decisions, the effect of which is 
completely haphazard and unpredictable.
In light of these empirical facts, advisors 
must decide how far to veer from traditional 
utility theory during the advisory process. 
should they forcibly tailor a mathematically 
well-behaving utility function to the cus-
tomer, or should they rely entirely on the 
customer’s current mood and seek no con-
sistency at all? The correct approach is most 
likely somewhere between the two extremes, 
in other words, the wishes and intentions of 
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the decision maker should be mapped out as 
thoroughly as possible, but at the same time 
the investor should also be driven towards 
making a rational choice. 
However, it is usually left to the conscience 
and temperament of the given advisors 
whether they try to mitigate the Minsky ef-
fect; whether they advise caution for custom-
ers hyped by spring sunshine; whether they 
invite customers to have a sugary soda before 
making important decisions; or they go even 
further and persuade shy female customers to 
take greater risk, or perhaps force consistent 
decision making or even strict risk averse be-
haviour.
Based on the review of practical models 
aimed at assessing risk appetite, we can state 
that the players of the advisor industry have 
not cleared up at all what their role is exactly, 
and how far they should go in serving their 
customers’ irrational desires and heuristics. 
The only consensus is that risk appetite should 
be measured some way or another, and regula-
tors are also in total agreement.
1 Acknowledgements: The authors wish to thank the 
Hungarian Academy of sciences for the support of 
its Momentum Programme (LP-004/2010), which 
made this research possible.
2  The price of derivatives also depends on these pref-
erences through the price of the base product, see 
Dömötör (2011).  
3  This sub-section was written on the basis of Varian 
(1992).
4  Affine transforms (multiplication by constant and 
shifting) do not modify the vNM utility function.
5  The various rationality concepts were addressed in 
depth by Jáki (2013a), who also examined their real-
isation empirically in a later related article (2013b).
6  This is called absolute risk aversion, which measures 
how the investor reacts to a given amount of change 
in their wealth. By examining how a given percent-
age of change in their initial wealth impacts their 
utility, we determine relative risk aversion (RRA).
7  Absolute risk aversion is  for a root function, and 
for a logarithmic function. In contrast, the relative 
risk aversion measure (cRRA ‒ constant relative risk 
aversion) is constant for these functions (always ½ 
and 1 respectively).
8  The same utility function is used in portfolio selec-
tion theories with downside risks, see Walter and 
Kóbor (2001).
9  on selecting the appropriate risk rate, and the cor-
rect distribution of risk within an organisation, see 
csóka, Herings, Kóczy (2007) and csóka (2003).
10  see for instance, Bodie, Kane, Marcus (2014); Faze-
kas, Gáspárné, soós (2008).
11  Expectations of uncertainty and success in connec-
tion with EPs forecasts was examined by Jáki and 
Neulinger (2013).
12  Intelligence Quotient Test and cognitive Reflection 
Test
13  The behavioural causes of systematic optimism were 
examined by Jáki (2013b). Her research focused on 
the presentation of overconfidence, overoptimism 
and the psychological immune system.
14  It is also in the context of corporate risk management 
that the corporate utility function can be interpreted. 
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In such cases, the starting point is usually the notion 
that relative risk aversion is constant (cRRA ‒ con-
stant relative risk aversion), see Dömötör (2013)
15 Homolya (2007) reviews the possible methods of 
determining risk tolerance in the field of banking 
operational risk management.
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